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ADMISSIBILTY OF CONFESSIONS MADE SUBSEQUENT TO AN ILLEGAL
ARREST: WONG SUN V. UNITED STATES REVISITED.
STATE V. MOORE, 275 N. C. 141, 166 S. E.2d 53 (1969).
Police, without proper arrest warrants,1 appre-
hended three men in connection with incidents of
looting and burning in Wilson, North Carolina the
night of April 6, 1968. Authorities insisted that
at the time of the arrests each suspect was advised
of his constitutional rights.2 Within minutes of
his apprehension one suspect, James Moore,
uttered inculpatory remarks in the presence of
arresting officers.3 Suspects Carl Speight and Bobby
Dawson implicated themselves with regard to the
damage in separate statements to police, but only
after spending a night in jail. At trial evidence
proved that each defendant had been arrested
illegally.4 The court found that the defendants'
statements following arrest were voluntary and
admissible.5 The three were convicted for malicious
damage to property. 6
1 Police allegedly moved to arrest the three defend-
ants on information from a person whom they refused
to identify and about whom they made no representa-
tion as to reliability. Furthermore, no attempt was made
to obtain valid warrants. State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141,
-, 166 S.E.2d 53, 55-56 (1969).
In accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1965).
3 State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141,--, 166 S.E.2d 53,
55 (1969).
4 The illegality of the arrests in question was based on
N.C. GEN. STAT. sec. 15-41:
A peace officer may without warrant arrest a per-
son: (1) When the person to be arrested has com-
mitted a felony or misdemeanor in the presence
of the officer, or when the officer has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a felony or misdemeanor in his
Airresence.
evidence showed that each defendant was arrested
without a warrant for misdemeanors not committed in
the presence of the arresting officers. State v. Moore,
275 N.C. 141,--, 166 S.E.2d 53, 56 (1969).
' Id. at-, 166 S.E.2d at 56.
aPoice versions as to the substance of each defend-
ant's post arrest remarks conflicted with the characteri-
zation of their statements offered by the defendants
themselves. Defendant Moore denied making any
incriminatory statement concerning his alleged role in
the damage. He insisted that he told police only that he
had seen a crowd break windows near his home as he
was leaving it that night. Dawson disputed police
testimony as to the date of his verbal admissions and
denied police testimony concerning the exact stores
which he allegedly joined in damaging. Dawson furtber
intimated that he pleaded guilty only after authorities
suggested that that step would bring him a lighter
sentence. In light of this controversy, it is interesting to
note that none of the statements made by the defend-
ants were reduced to writing. Id. at,- 166 S.E.2d at 55.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction.Y The defendants then appealed to
the state supreme court claiming that their incul-
patory statements were inadmissible since they
were made subsequent to illegal arrests. The
prosecution, they argued, ought to be denied the
evidentiary rewards of illegal investigatory activ-
ity.8
The court rejected these arguments and held
that every remark made by a person in custody
after an illegal apprehension "is not ipso facto
inadmissible." 9 Admissibility was to be determined
by a voluntariness standard which required an
assessment of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the defendants' arrests and in-custody
statements.10 In essence voluntariness would
depend upon the presence or absence of "violent
or oppressive" police conduct prior to the con-
fessions in question.l
An illegal arrest "unaccompanied by oppressive
circumstances" was termed "no more coercive
than a legal arrest." 1 The court held that in the
absence of coercion the statements of a defendant
are to be placed in evidence even th'ough they
follow violation of his Fourth Amendment right
7 3 N.C. App. 286, 164 S.E.2d 620 (1968).
8 State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141,-, 166 S.E.2d 53,
56 (1969).
9 Id. at-, 166 S.E.2d at 62.10 Id. at-, 166 S.E.2d at 62 "Voluntariness remains
as the test of admissibility." A precedent for the court's
view of the test for admissibility was State v. Barnes,
264 N.C. 517, 520, 142 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1965), which
held that
[lit is essential not only that full investigation be
made and evidence be recorded, but facts must
be found which disclose circumstances and condi-
tions surrounding the making of incriminating
admissions.
On remand, the trial court in Barnes held a hearing to
undertake a full investigation of recorded evidence,
together with an examination of facts that might have
disclosed any coercion behind the incriminating state-
ments. See also State v. Conyers, 267 N.C. 618, 148
S.E.2d 569 (1966).
1 State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141,-, 166 S.E.2d 53,
60 & 62 (1969). The court relied on the holding in
United States v. Close, 349 F.2d 841, 851 (4th Cir.
1965), that a confession following an illegal arrest
"which is shown to have been freely and voluntarily
made without coercion either physical or psychological
... is admissible."
12 State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141,-, 166 S.E.2d 53,
62 (1969).
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to be free from arrest without probable cause. 3
A remand was ordered, however, since the trial
judge 4 had failed to make the requisite findings
on the voluntariness in fact of the defendants'
confessions. 5
Since 1914 exclusionary rules have barred the
admission in federal courts of physical evidence
secured through illegal search and seizure.
6
Federal courts have long recognized that evidence
obtained as a result of such illegal police activity
is inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 17
That rule was made applicable to the states in
Mapp v. Ohio, which held that "all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
the Federal Constitution is inadmissible at trial
in a state court." 8
The federal exclusionary rules were later ex-
tended to evidence which was observed 9 or
1 Id. at-, 166 S.E.2d at 62. Fourth Amendment
proscriptions and federal standards against illegal
search, seizure, and arrest were held to apply in toto to
the states in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-34
(1963). The Fourth Amendment reads,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
14 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,391 (1964),
holding that the voluntariness of a confession is not a
jury question, but must be passed on by the trial
judge or an independently convened jury.
That rule was first applied in North Carolina in
State v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572 (1951).
Rogers held that a confession would be tested for
voluntariness before the trial judge in the absence of the
jury.
"s State v. Moore, supra note 12 at-, 166 S.E.2d at
62. The trial judge entered the following statement in
the record,
[Tihe court finds as a fact that any statement made
by either of the three defendants was made freely
and voluntarily... and that the evidence in regard
to same is competent in this criminal action.
The North Carolina Supreme Court found error and
remanded because the content of that entry was con-
clusory and not based upon legitimate findings of fact.
6See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
The decision excluded from evidence items seized
during an illegal search of the defendant's residence by
federal investigatory authorities.
"7 See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939), where Mr. justice Frankfurter referred to
evidence which was the product of an unlawful search
(wire tapping) as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The
phrase is often used to characterize evidence deemed
inadmissible in the wake of unconstitutional police
activity.
"8367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11 McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st
Cir. 1955).
heard" as a result of an illegal search and seizure.
The type of police conduct that occasioned appli-
cation of exclusionary rules was not limited to
search and seizure, however. Illegal arrest as well
had always been included within the Fourth
Amendment proscriptions.2 These extensive ex-
clusionary standards became applicable in toto to
the states through Ker v. California.22
The admissibility of oral evidence in the form
of confessions given by suspects illegally arrested
arose in Wong Suir v. United States,2 upon which
the State v. Moore defendants relied in arguing
the inadmissibility of their inculpatory remarks.
In Wong Sun, federal authorities entered the
residence of James Wah Toy and arrested him
without probable cause.24 Toy immediately voiced
self-incriminatory statements to the agents. The
Supreme Court emphasized that the Fourth
Amendment and attendant exclusionary rules
commanded that his confession could not be used
in evidence against him.2" It held that "verbal
evidence which derives so immediately from an
unlawful entry and unauthorized arrest is no less
the fruit of official illegality than the more tangible
fruits of the unwarranted intrusion." 26
20 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1960)
reversing 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960). At trial the
prosecution was permitted to introduce into evidence
incriminating conversations engaged in by the appellant
at an alleged gambling establishment. The conversa-
tions were monitored by police through use of a micro-
phone thrust through the walls of the house from the
outside. On appeal, the Supreme Court characterized
the eavesdropping as "an unauthorized physical pene-
tration into premises" recognized as "a constitutionally
protected area." The evidence (conversations) so
obtained was found to be "fruit of the poisonous tree"
and inadmissible. Id. at 509-512.
2 See supra note 13. See also Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959). Federal officers investigating the
theft of an interstate shipment of whiskey observed on
two occasions cartons being loaded into a car in a
residential district. They followed the car, arrested the
petitioner who was driving, and seized cartons contain-
ing radios stolen from a different interstate shipment.
At trial that evidence was admitted over the petitioner's
objections. The court reversed, asserting that the
officers had no probable cause for arrest when they
stopped the car. The evidence arising out of the illegal
arrest was ruled inadmissible.
374 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1963).
-371 U.S. 471 (1963).
2Id. at 479. Police, in arresting Toy, acted on
information from one Hom Way about whom no show-
ing was made as to reliability. At the time of the arrest,
no warrants were outstanding. Id. at 479-480.
25 Id. at 484-487. See infra notes 32-34 and accom-
panying text for further elaboration of this holding.
2 Id. at 485. See also: Kamisar, Illegal Searches or
Seizires and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements:
A Dialogue, 1961 U. Ir.. L. F. 78, 84-96 (1961).
NOTE
WONG SUN REVISITED
On the other hand, the Wong Sun opinion, like
State v. Moore, asserted that an unconstitutional
arrest does not ipso facto invalidate a subsequent
confession.27 Wong Sun, a second defendant, had
been illegally arrested, then arraigned and released.
He voluntarily returned several days later to
confess. The Court held that his confession was
admissible since its relationship to the uncon-
stitutional arrest was extremely "attenuated." 
28
The Court did not define the criteria for ascer-
taining when the relationship between an illegal
arrest and a subsequent confession is so tenuous
as to warrant the admission of a confession. How-
ever, two factors were inherent in the decision's
differing treatment of the respective confessions
of Toy and Wong Sun.
One factor appeared to be that of voluntariness.
Defendant Toy probably would not have con-
fessed if police had not entered his house without
a proper warrant.29 The Court treated that prob-
lem in discussing the impact of police entry into
Toy's bedroom at night where his wife and child
lay sleeping. The decision explained that "under
the circumstances it [would be] unreasonable to
infer that Toy's response [inculpatory statements]
was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the
primary taint of unlawful invasion." 10 The Court
viewed illegal police conduct as a causative factor
in Toy's immediate confession.
Wong Sun, however, was assumed to have acted
on his own volition. The fact that he was released
and returned days later to confess substantiated
the finding of voluntariness. 1 The Court went no
further in considering whether his illegal arrest
represented a causative element in the act of
confession.
27Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491
(1963). The Court stated that position in discussing
only the case of the second defendant Wong Sun.
2Id. at 491.
... we hold that the connection between the arrest
and statement had become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint.
A similar problem was also dealt with in Fahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), decided by the Su-
preme Court shortly after Wong Sun. Police had
obtained incriminating evidence during an illegal
search of the defendant's premises. Based on that
unconstitutionally seized evidence, police arrested
Fahy. Subsequent to his arrest the defendant uttered
damaging statements.The Court asserted in dictum that
Fahy "should have had a chance to show that his
admissions were induced by being confronted with the
illegally seized evidence." Id. at 91.
30 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486
(1963).31Id. at 491.
The second factor underlying the Wong Sun
decision was the Supreme Court's approach to
deterrence of police illegality. The procurement
of confessions possibly represented the motivation
behind police utilization of illegal arrest tactics.P
Law enforcement officials probably would be less
willing to act illegally if the evidence so obtained
proved inadmissible.P Once agreeing that the arrest
and subsequent incarceration were unlawful, the
Wong Sun court intimated that the exclusion of
confessions arising out of that illegality could
logically be required. Thus the Court excluded
Toy's statements in order to "[deter] lawless
conduct by federal officers [and to close] the doors
of the federal courts to any use of evidence un-
constitutionally obtained." 4
However, the Court ruled that preventing
admission of Wong Sun's confession would not
deter police illegality since he was released from
custody and returned voluntarily to confess days
later. The confession represented no direct product
of his prior illegal arrest and was not excluded. 5
The Supreme Court in Wong Sun failed to
indicate the relative weight to be given the two
analytical factors inherent in the decision-
voluntariness-causation and deterrence of police
illegality. Yet the recent case of Morales v. New
York"6 provided the Cdurt with another oppor-
tunity to treat the question. The defendant was
arrested as a murder suspect and confessed after
less than an hour in custody. A lower court applied
2 See Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Con-
temporaneous Incriminating Statements, 1961 U. ILL.
L.F. 122-123 n.201 (1961).
-1See People v. Bilderbach, 62 Cal. 2d 757, 766-67,
401 P.2d 921, 927 (1965), where the court concluded
that admission of confessions obtained subsequent to
illegal arrests would encourage the police to act ille-
gally in the hope that a conviction would result.
If the court were to admit such statements, the
police would not be sufficiently deterred from en-
gaging in illegal searches [or other illegal conduct]
... The police would be encouraged... in the hope
of obtaining confessions... "
34 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486
(1963). See also Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214(1955) and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
31 With regard to defendant Wong Sun, the Court
allowed the voluntariness finding to override any
deterrence function. However, added weight to deter-
tence factors would seem no less appropriate in Wong
Sun's case than with that of defendant Toy. The Court
denied police the rewards of their illegal conduct
toward Toy. Toy's confession was excluded as the
product of his illegal rrest. Defendant Wong Sun
confessed as well, but at a later date. Was his confession
any less a reward to police arising out of an illegal ar-
rest? That remains a key issue for consideration.3,-. U.S.- (1969).
a voluntariness test in admitting the confession
into evidence. The Supreme Court refused to
disturb that voluntariness finding below but
deferred consideration of possible application of
deterrence principles. It termed the record below
insufficient on the question of the legality of the
defendant's arrest. As the Court phrased it,
[t]he State may be able to show that there was
probable cause for an arrest ... or that the con-
fessions were not the product of illegal deten-
tion.... [Mn the absence of a record which
squarely and necessarily presents the issue and
fully illuminates the factual context in which the
question arises, we choose not to grapple with[it] .s7
Other cases since Wong Sun have fallen into
two distinct lines of authority based on the weight
accorded to voluntariness on the one hand and
deterrence of police illegality on the other.5 The
decision in State v. Moore is best understood in
terms of this post-Wong Sun dichotomy.
Emphasis on the deterrence factor alone led
some courts to rule that all evidence, including
confessions, obtained subsequent to illegal police
conduct must be excluded. Thus in People v.
Sesslin3" the admission of evidence obtained after
a defendant's arrest and during his illegal detention
was held to have violated Fourth Amendment
7 Id.
I The court in State v. Moore 275 N.C. 141,-, 166
S.E.2d 53, 58 (1969), acknowledged this division of
authority. As the decision emphasized:
We find no United States Supreme Court decision
on this precise point since the decision in Wong
Sun; however, the language used by the Supreme
Court in Wong Sun has been interpreted by the
state and lower federal courts so as to produce a
definite split of authority.
29 68 Cal. 2d 418, 439 P.2d 321, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409
(1968). See other cases representative of this approach
as follows: Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d 666 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), in which one of the defendants was arrested
without probable cause. He was brought to police
headquarters where he confessed to robbery. The court
looked to Wong Sun in holding that "the illegal arrest
alone made the post arrest admission... poisonous
fruit." Id. at 672; State v. Mercurio, 96 R.I. 464, 194
A.2d 574 (1963). The defendant was arrested for ille-
gal gambling operations. Arrest was accomplished
without a warrant or probable cause. The court cited to
Wong Sun for the principle that none of the "evidence
seized and incriminating statements elicited from one
whose arrest had not been made with probable cause
[was] admissible" at trial. Id. at 468, 194 A.2d at 576.
See also United States v. Middleton, 344 F.2d 78 (2d
Cir. 1965); United States v. Maresse, 344 F.2d 501
(3rd Cir. 1964); Allen v. Cupp, 298 F. Supp. 432 (D.
Ore. 1969); United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43(E.D.N.Y. 1968); Lyons v. United States, 221 A.2d 711
(D.C. Ct. App. 1966).
rights. Citing Wong Sun, the California Supreme
Court asserted that "the state may not use evi-
dence to convict a defendant obtained by exploit-
ing an illegal arrest or detention."4 It recognized
that an admission of such evidence would weaken
the deterrence function inherent in exclusionary
rules.4'
This position was restated by the United States
Supreme Court itself in dictum in Terry v. Ohio.
42
The Court insisted that "the rule excluding evi-
dence [obtained] in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment has been recognized as a principal mode of
discouraging lawless police conduct... experience
has taught that it is the only effective deterrent to
police misconduct in the criminal context .... "43
A second line of authority, after Wong Sun has
refused to follow this notion and has used the
voluntariness-causation factor as the sole measure
of admissibility. Under this analysis, courts have
admitted a "voluntary" confession despite any
prior illegality in conduct toward the accused. 4
In Prescoe v. Stake'5 , police arrested the defendant
without a warrant or probable cause. While in
custody, he gave police a written confession of his
participation in a burglary. The court looked to
Wong Sun asserting that that decision involved
41 People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal. 2d 418, 426-27, 439 P.2d
321, 327, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409, 415 (1968).41 Id. at 427. The admission of the evidence (in
the form of handwriting exemplars) would therefore
" 'thwart the laudable policies [deterrence function]
underlying the exclusionary rule."' See also Bynum v.
United States, 262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1959); State v.
Miller, 76 N.M. 62, 412 P.2d 240 (1966).; People v.
Bilderbach, 62 Cal. 2d 757, 401 P.2d 921, 44 Cal. Rptr.
313 (1965).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
43 Id. at 12.
"In United States v. Close, 349 F.2d 841 (4th Cir.)
cert. denied 382 U.S. 992 (1965) the defendant had
confessed to a bank robbery while illegally detained on
a vagrancy charge. The confession was found to be
voluntary. It was admitted in evidence (with citation
to Wong Sun v. United States) since "a statement
which is shown to have been freely and voluntarily
made without coercion... is admissible." Id. at 851.
In People v. Freeland, 218 Cal. App. 2d 199, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (1963)(may no longer be good law after
People v. Sesslin, supra note 40), police detained the
defendant without probable cause. They questioned
him intermittently for hours. At trial, no evidence of
threats of duress was adduced. The court admitted the
confession into evidence denying any relation between
the defendant's remarks and the prior illegal arrest
sufficient to taint that evidence. The ultimate test of
the confession's admissibility remained volition in fact.
The inquiry went to a determination of the degree to
which the inculpatory remarks were "the product of
his [the defendant's] own choice, and not that of the
illegal restraint." Id. at 204, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
45 231 Md. 486, 191 A.2d 226 (1963).
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no departure from the voluntariness test long
recognized in the jurisdiction. The confession
there was found to be voluntary and admissible
since "there [was] no indication that there can-
not be a voluntary confession after an illegal
arrest .... 141
Other courts have chosen to phrase the volun-
tariness test in terms of "causation" and have
arrived at the same conclusion 47 They have ruled
that if illegal police conduct was "an operative
factor in bringing out the confession" only then
should it be termed inadmissible.48
State v. Moore followed the line of authority that
has placed great weight on the voluntariness-
causation factor rather than on the deterrence
element. While the North Carolina opinion men-
tioned condemnation of "any illegal act by police,"
no provision was made for deterrence of such
conduct.49 In joining decisions that have opposed
the extension of exclusionary rules to cover con-
fessions following illegal police activity, the State
v. Moore court acceded to such illegality. The
decision allowed authorities the benefit of spon-
taneous statements arising out of unlawful but
46 Id. at 494, 191 A.2d 231.
47 State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246,196 A.2d 755 (1963),
cert. denied 377 U.S. 960 (1963). This case designated
causation as an element to be assessed in addition to
voluntariness in a test for the admissibility of a con-
fession. Reference to causation as a separate factor in
any voluntariness analysis appeared unique since any
distinction between voluntariness and causation was
difficult to draw. The voluntariness test would seem to
assume a causation determination. Thus, the court
pointed to a distinction without a difference:
But even though, from the evidence produced, a
confession made during an illegal detention is
properly found to have been truly voluntary,
nevertheless, if the illegal detention was an opera-
tive factor in cusing or bringing about the con-
fession, then the confession will be considered as
the fruit of the illegal detention and will be inad-
missible. Id. at 249, 196 A.2d at 757.
A confession caused by the coercive influence of an
illegal detention should not be termed voluntary in the
first place.
See also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
Defendant was accused of painting swastikas on a
synagogue. Police searched his car without a warrant
or probable cause. They discovered a paintbrush and
can of paint. Confronted with that evidence, the defend-
ant confessed. The trial court allowed Fahy no oppor-
tunity to claim that police possession of the illegally
seized evidence led to his confession. The Supreme
Court excluded the can and brush and then reasoned in
dictum that the defendant should have been granted an
opportunity to show that his admission was induced
by being confronted with that evidence.
48 State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246, 249, 196 A.2d 755,
759 (1963).
4" State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141,-, 166 S.E.2d 53,
62 (1969).
useful arrest practices contingent upon a finding
of voluntariness.50
This voluntariness test assumes the ability of
a suspect to decide apart from undue pressure
whether to confess. Illegal police tactics and the
need to apply exclusionary principles are to be
measured in terms of the confessor's free will.
However, the question remains whether the vol-
untariness test insures the reliability of a defend-
ant's statements as evidence.5'
State v. Moore held that on retrial the lower
court must undertake a sophisticated inquiry into
the suspects' mental states at the time of their
confessions.52 The court assumed that the trial
judge could determine whether the inculpatory
statements were the product of free and rational
choice, deliberately and knowingly given.53
In the end, that voluntariness test would force
the trial court to assess from the bench complex
psychological unknowns. How could a judge gauge
the extent to which the illegal arrest itself tended
to incorporate a coercive atmosphere into the
period of apprehension and interrogation? A
degree of immeasurable coercion might underlay
any prior illegal arrest. The reality of unlawful
police tactics as they fell upon the three defendants
50 In Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 572
(1961), Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred to similar
arrest and detention activities as a "common, although
generally unlawful, practice."
a For evidentiary standards of reliability see 3
WIGiroR, EvmENcE §823 (3rd ed. 1940).
State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141 - 166 S.E.2d 53,
62 (1969). Some authority for te North Carolina
court's requirement of a voluntariness hearing is found
with the decision in Bray v. United States, 306 F.2d
743, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1962) which held that:
... the trial court should [hold] a hearing out of the
presence of the jury on the question whether
appellant's written confession introduced at trial
was voluntary.
That hearing was held to be mandatory even if the
defendant failed to request one himself. See also State v.
Conyers, 267 N.C. 618, 148 S.E.2d 569 (1966).
Other cases have made similar demands. See
People v. Freeland, 218 Cal. App. 2d 199,32 Cal. Rptr.
132 (1963) (may no longer be good law after People v.
Sesslin, supra note 40). The case phrases the voluntari-
ness test (to be applied by the trial court judge) in terms
of the following inquiries: Was the accused person's will
overbom? Was his decision the product of a rational
intellect and free will?
A more recent case in the same jurisdiction, People v.
Lewis, 68 Cal. Rptr. 790 (Ct. App. 1968), asserted that
in testing the voluntariness of a confession (here made
,subsequent to a legal arrest but under questionable
interrogation circumstances) the trial judge must
explore all circumstances surrounding the interrogation
as well as the conduct of the particular defendant in
order to "reconstruct [the] defendant's mental condition
immediately preceding his confession." Id. at 793.
19701
might have struck such fear and confusion in their
minds that no subsequent confession could be
termed voluntary. Could it be assumed that the
voluntariness test would serve as an adequate
measure of such inner tensions? Significant doubt
would remain as to voluntariness in fact given the
myriad of possible mental reactions by the accused
to the illegal police conduct wrought upon them.54
State v. Moore provided that the voluntariness
hearing must concentrate on "the facts and
circumstances surrounding the arrest and in-
custody statements" of the accused.5' That this
test has often worked injustice was shown by a
1966 United States Supreme Court decision over-
ruling a North Carolina federal court. 56 The case
involved the confession of a man who was held
incommunicado in a tiny cell for two weeks. The
defendant had been fed only two sandwiches per
day, was continually questioned, and finally con-
fessed. The trial judge applied the voluntariness
test to those circumstances and allowed the con-
fession in evidence.
Recognition of the possibilities for similar in-
justice in application of the voluntariness test
in federal courts led to a series of decisions grafting
certain objective requirements upon any assess-
ment of a confession's admissibility. The most
famous of those decisions was Miranda v. Arizona."
The Supreme Court there ruled that the accused
must be afforded clear warning of his right to
silence and his right to the assistance of counsel
before a confession would be considered volun-
tary.
8
54On remand of this case, the trial judge would be
bound by North Carolina law providing that a con-
fession is to be admitted only if the results of the
voluntariness hearing are "conclusive" as to whether or
not it was "freely and voluntarily" made. State v.
Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 291, 158 S.E.2d 511, 517 (1968).
Conclusive discovery of the voluntariness in fact of a
confession, given the need to assess difficult mental and
psychological considerations, could well prove impos-
sible. All this diminishes the soundness of a voluntari-
ness test as a method for protecting an accused's con-
stitutional rights. See, Developments in the Law-Con-fessions, 79 HARv. L. Rxv. 935, 984 (1966).
55 State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141,-, 166 S.E. 2d 53,
62 (1969).
16 Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 373 (1966)
rev'g 221 F. Supp. 494(E.D.N.C.1963), aff'd 339 F.2d
770 (4th Cir. 1964).
'7 384 U.S. 436 (1966).5s Congress has threatened the efficacy of those
standards. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act has removed the mandatory nature of
the Miranda warnings as a prerequisite to an admissible
confession. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968). This represents,
in effect, a return to the "totality of the circumstances"
test for voluntariness within which there is so much
Fair and accurate application of any volun-
tariness test is a formidable undertaking. Assur-
ance of the reliability of a confession as evidence
can only come with police corroboration of the
information obtained through a confession. 9
Should a confession be admitted in evidence, courts
require the information derived therefrom to be
corroborated in order to warrant a conviction."
The law appears to place little faith in the evidence
of confessions alone.
With that in mind, courts should exclude con-
fessions made subsequent to the use of uncon-
stitutional arrest tactics by police. It is appro-
priate to suppress those confessions and channel
police conduct toward the gathering of evidence
in a constitutional fashion.
Exclusion of those confessions alone, however,
would fail to prevent police from utilizing infor-
mation derived from a defendant's inculpatory
room for injustice. The ultimate decision as to volun-
tariness in a federal court once again rests upon thejudgment of the trial judge without the benefit of
obligatory objective requirements. The federal courts
would appear to have returned to the uncertainties of
the State v. Moore type of voluntariness determination.
There is, however, evidence that the Miranda v.
Arizona decision itself led to some instances of unjust
application of the voluntariness test. For instance, the
trial judge in California v. Wheeler, 243 Cal. App. 2d
340, 52 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1966), assumed that the mere
recitation of Miranda warnings itself was sufficient to
establish the voluntariness of a confession made subse-
quent to an unlawful arrest. So too, in People v.
Johnson, 70 Cal. 2d 577, 450 P.2d 865, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401
1969) it was pointed out that courts tend to treat
deliverance of the Miranda warnings as sufficient to
guarantee that subsequent confessions are voluntary.
The danger here is that police will be encouraged to
make illegal arrests in hopes of obtaining confessions
after Miranda warnings have been given. This danger
would not arise in a jurisdiction that applied the deter-
rence factor since no such confession would be admissi-
ble.
9 See People v. Bernstein, 171 Cal. App. 2d 279, 340
P.2d 299 (1959). The court warned that evidence of a
defendant's admission made subsequent to illegal police
conduct should be viewed with caution, for a conviction
cannot be predicated solely upon such evidence.60 See United States v. Michilopoulas, 228 F. Supp.
944 (D.D.C. 1964). The court there reasoned that in
order to eliminate the possibility of false confessions,
the law will not permit a conviction on the basis of an
uncorroborated confession standing alone. It required
corroboration either by separate proof of the corpus
delicti or by independent evidence sustaining the trust-
worthiness of the confession.
People v. Chapman 261 Cal. App. 149, 67 Cal. Rptr.
601 (1968), forwarded the idea that a determination as
to whether a confession is "fruit of the poisonous tree"
required inquiry as to the information derived from the
admission, and whether that information would have
been discovered through independent sources. See also




remarks to gather additional admissible evidence
seemingly independent of the confession in ques-
tion. Without more, there would be cases where a
confession subsequent to an illegal arrest would
be excluded, but evidence gathered with the aid
of the defendant's statements would not. Effective
deterrence requires denial to police of all evidence
arising out of an illegal arrest, including such
derivative information.
In any case of this type, exclusion would serve
a desirable purpose. Trial judges would no longer
deal with the uncertainties of a voluntariness
test requiring analysis of the often indeterminate
effects of illegal arrest upon an accused. Police
and trial court judges would know where they
stand with regard to any confession at issue.
Exclusion, however, ought not to become an
unbending principle. It remains subject to the
exigencies of a significant factor-time. For what
happens when the victim of illegal police conduct
confesses years after the fact? Is his confession to
be ruled inadmissible since it followed an illegal
arrest? How long after an arrest is the deterrence
factor to receive primary consideration over that
of voluntariness?
Little deterrence value would result from the
exclusion of a confession offered years after an
illegal arrest." Police are not likely to intimidate
an accused with an eye to eliciting an admissible
confession a year or two later. So too courts would
probably refuse to exclude such a confession with
some sense of its apparent voluntariness. The
notion of a temporal factor placing limits on the
courts' obligation to deter illegal police conduct
seems necessary.
With the possibility of a confession long after
an illegal arrest, the uncertainties that plague
the voluntariness test arise to haunt the deterrence
purpose. The psychological impact of an illegal
arrest as it affects a confession even years later
becomes a new unknown. If a lengthy span of time
intervenes between an unlawful apprehension and
subsequent confession, even the deterrence pur-
pose may well offer no rationale for exclusion of a
defendant's remarks.
11 See generally, Voluntary Incriminating Statements
Made Subsequent to an Illegal Arrest-A Proposed Modi-fication of the Exclusionary Rude, 71 Dicx. L. REv. 573
(1967).
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